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How Taxis, Peanuts and Assault Rifles Get You a Martini for
Dinner: Examining Peanut Quotas and Taxi Medallions in
Consideration of Whether a Fifth Amendment Takings
Claim is a Red Herring when Eliminating Alcohol
License Quota Systems
Alcohol Licenses under a Quota System: Non-Compensable
Regulatory License or Compensable Property Right
in an Entrenched Legacy Market
Karen Powell*
This Article argues that allowing increased on-premise alcohol li-
censes will provide increased economic development through compe-
tition, without sacrificing public safety. Opponents of dismantling the
on-premise quota system have consistently argued that a closed sys-
tem is necessary, and may implicate a takings claim by current licen-
sees. Review of relevant takings claim cases, including cases relating
to peanut quotas and taxi medallions, however, supports opening
those legacy markets by allowing new licensees into the marketplace,
with little legal support for a successful takings claim relating to the
value of the current licensee's license on a secondary market.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The current legacy alcohol license quota system prevents new en-
trants into the restaurant and tavern industry and is a disincentive to
economic growth for communities due to the high cost of accessing a
license to compete in a closed market. Current holders of those li-
censes claim that their property value in the license1 is so great as to
prevent governmental entities from allowing increased entry into the
market.
More than half the states have fully accessible, and unrestricted al-
cohol licensing for on-premise locations, driving increased economic
development without sacrificing public safety or health. However, the
remaining states have not followed suit or been able to deregulate
their legacy alcohol licensing systems.
This Article argues that modern business practices require changes
in the regulatory system to address new market conditions. Alcohol
licensing has yet to see modernization of the on-premise license struc-
ture. One of the main political and legal threats used by entrenched
license holders is the takings claim against the government when there
is a threat of opening the entrenched market system.
1. See Alexander Deedy, Liquor License Capped Out: Montana at Limit Under Quota System,
HELENA INDEPENDENT RECORD (Jan. 25, 2015, 6:00 AM), available at http://helenair.com/news/
localliquor-licenses-capped-out-montana-at-limit-under-quota-system/article-e9f5928-033c-5
e49-801d-b1a85935b4b1.html.
ALCOHOL LICENSES UNDER A QUOTA SYSTEM
The Article argues that the current licensees' takings claim in elimi-
nating alcohol licensing quota systems is a red herring and should not
be used as a political or legal threat to prevent modernization of the
system. Both the legacy license system and the results of allowing a
successful takings claim are not economically optimal for society as a
whole.
Without the legal threat of a takings claim, consumers can drive
governmental entities to open the quota system with additional access
to on-premise liquor licenses to allow more organic economic devel-
opment in communities currently under extreme restrictions. Further,
while there are extensive health studies relating to limiting bottle sale
locations (such a liquor stores and package stores), there is little pub-
lic health research, if any, for limiting restaurants and bars from enter-
ing the marketplace to sell alcohol by the glass.
What characteristics must be considered when weighing how to de-
termine whether a government issued license is a property right, or
whether it may only have a property value associated with it? When
might a license be property, but yet not be a property right with a
compensable takings claim attached to it?
While there is little direct legal analysis by the courts on removing
or expanding the quota system and its effects on current license hold-
ers, courts have addressed similar closed licensing systems in taxi me-
dallion licenses, peanut quota systems and game farm licenses, which
provide a framework for consideration of alcohol licensing cases. Re-
view of taxi medallion and peanut quota cases indicate that while leg-
acy licensing systems with quotas are generally considered to provide
more economic value for the licensees, there is little support for that
license value to rise to a property right that can be compensable under
the Fifth Amendment when a governmental entity opens the market-
place to new entrants.
This Article first reviews the history, law and economics of the cur-
rent alcohol licensing quota system. Part III reviews a takings claim
elements in the context of alcohol licensing. Part IV looks to parallel
cases such as peanut quota systems and taxi medallion licensing. Part
V discusses alcohol licensing differences from the other regulatory
schemes, and finally the Article concludes with a policy discussion of
the most efficient method to open a legacy alcohol license system.
20151
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II. HISTORY, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ALCOHOL LICENSING
QUOTA SYSTEMS
Alcohol has been a critical commodity and economic base since
before the inception of the United States, and continues to be a driv-
ing force 2 in the United States economy.
The Distilled Spirits Council of the Unites States ("DISCUS") 3 re-
ports that the U.S. beverage alcohol industry is a major contributor to
the economy, "responsible for over $400 billion in total U.S. economic
activity in 2010, generating nearly $90 billion in wages and over 3.9
million jobs for U.S. workers."' 4 In 2010, "distilled spirits accounted
for over $120 billion in total economic activity, or 30% of total eco-
nomic activity from all beverage alcohol."'5
During that same year, the beverage alcohol industry "contributed
over $21 billion directly to state and local revenues.6 The beverage
alcohol industry's "total contribution to state and local revenues was
over $41 billion, with $20.1 billion coming from "indirect revenues
such as corporate, personal income, property and other taxes gener-
ated by the beverage alcohol industry."' 7 Total revenues from distilled
spirits, both direct and indirect, for 2010 were "$15.5 billion, or 37%
of total beverage alcohol revenue," 8 leaving beer and wine with over
60% of the alcohol industry revenue.
2. Prior to passage of the Sixteenth Amendment (allowing for an income tax not apportioned
by census), excise tax on alcohol provided a large percentage of the funding for the new govern-
ment. With the shift to an income tax, and then the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment
(Prohibition), the U.S. government's budget no longer balanced on the alcohol industry. Now
the industry provides a smaller portion of the federal budget in excise tax revenues, but is a
major economic driver.
3. DISCUS is the national trade association for America's distilling industry and represents
seventy percent of all distilled spirits brands sold in the U.S. See History of the Distilled Spirits
Council, DISCUS, http://www.discus.org/about/history/ (last visited May 15, 2015).
4. Economic Contributions of the Distilled Spirits Industry, DISCUS, http://www.discus.org/
economics/ (last visited May 15, 2015) [hereinafter DISCUS Economic Contributions].
5. Id. DISCUS also reports that
distilled spirits are one of the highest taxed consumer products in the United States.
Standardizing for alcohol content, the distilled spirits federal excise tax burden (per
proof gallon) is more than double that of beer and almost triple that of wine. The
federal excise tax burden per proof gallon for distilled spirits is $13.50. In comparison,
the tax burden per proof gallon for beer and wine is $6.18 and $4.86, respectively.
Id.
6. Id. "Of that amount, distilled spirits accounted for over $8.8 billion or 41% of this direct
revenue." Id.
7. DISCUS Economic Contributions, supra note 4. According to DISCUS reports, "[flederal,
state and local taxes accounted for $7.83, or 54%, of the average $14.42 price for a typical 750ml
bottle of 80 proof distilled spirits in the United States in 2012." Id.
8. Id.
ALCOHOL LICENSES UNDER A QUOTA SYSTEM
What is the licensing structure that allows a consumer to easily or-
der a martini with dinner in some states but not others?
After the Great Depression and as part of the New Deal Era regu-
latory framework, many cities and states implemented regulatory li-
censing systems using quotas based on population. Some of those
regulatory areas included retail alcohol sales licenses, peanut farm
quota systems, and taxi licensing systems.
While the alcohol industry is an important economic driver, the al-
cohol regulatory arena varies wildly by jurisdiction (either by state or
in some cases, by county.) Ordering a martini requires finding an "on-
premise" licensed establishment, and each jurisdiction may set differ-
ing requirements for those licenses. An on-premise license is the term
used for a license that allows for retail, by the glass, sales of alcohol.
A number of jurisdictions have limited license availability, set by a
quota number, to control access to the license system. 9 These legacy
quota on-premise licenses are based on census numbers by county or
other local jurisdiction in the 1940s. Little, if no change, to the quota
system has occurred since that time. Currently, the quota system for
retail liquor sales is in place in Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida,
Idaho, Kentucky, 10 Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, a"
New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio,12 Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Utah,1 3 and Washington, and parts of D.C.1 4 The quota system for on-
premise licensing has created an artificial secondary market, incen-
9. See Deedy, supra note 1.
10. Kentucky has a quota system of one license per 2500 residents, with some licenses issued
outside the quota system to address franchise growth. See Governor's Task Force on the Study
of Kentucky's Alcoholic Beverage Control Laws, Recommendations of the Licensing Committee,
KY.GOV 51 (Jan. 2013), available athttp://abc.ky.gov/ABC%20Task%20Force%20Report/Licens
ing%20Committee%20Recommendations.pdf [hereinafter Governor's Task Force]. In contrast,
Wisconsin has a modified quota system, as of 1997, which allows for a license for every 500
residents, and also has franchise exceptions. See Budget Briefs from the Legislative Reference
Bureau, Changes in Liquor License Laws, WISCONSIN.GOV 1 (Nov. 1997), available at http://legis.
wisconsin.gov/lrblpubslbudbriefs/97bb12.pdf (last visited May, 2015).
11. Alcohol Beverage Licenses: Bars, Taverns and Restaurants, MONTANA.GOV, https://
revenue.mt.gov/home/liquor/alcoholbeverage-licenses#horizontalTab6 (last visited May 15,
2015).
12. Department of Commerce, Liquor Control, OHbo.Gov, http://com.ohio.gov/liqr/
about.aspx (last visited May 15, 2015).
13. Utah Legislature Business & Labor Interim Committee, Summary Highlights of State Im-
posed Alcoholic Beverage License Quota Systems, LE.UTAH.GOV (May 16, 2012), available at
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view id=6&clip-id=1444&metaid=56719.
14. See Jim Saksa, Rum Deal, SLATE (June 12, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/
moneybox!2014/06/america s booze lawsworse-than-you.thought.html; see also Utah Legisla-
ture Business & Labor Interim Committee, supra note 13 (setting forth comparative license sta-
tus for 11 western states, eight of which have a license quota system: Arizona, California, New
Mexico (for liquor only), Utah, Washington, Wyoming, Idaho, and Montana).
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tivizing current license holders to base the value of their business on
the value of their license on a secondary market. 15
The legal and economic landscape for alcohol licensing is complex
and nuanced, but consumers have little patience for the byzantine sys-
tem and are clamoring from access to all types of quality liquor, re-
gardless of the regulatory structure. The shift in the United States to
increasing growth of craft breweries and distilleries changed the con-
sumer palette, and consumer expectation of being able to access spir-
its. In the past few years, consumer desires have driven state
governments to eliminate restrictions on selling alcohol on Sundays
and election days, many counties have voted to move from being dry
counties to allowing sales of alcohol, and expanded tastings are availa-
ble at many U.S. craft alcohol manufacturing facilities. 16 The U.S.
hospitality industry is on the rise, with a 2.9% growth between 2012
and 2013, with over 14 millions jobs. 17 .
A. Historical Significance of the Legacy On-Premise License
How are those legacy on-premise licenses still part of the regulatory
environment in so many states? The rich history of economic and so-
cial presence of alcohol in America dates back to the beginning of the
U.S. government. The early federalists viewed and treated liquor as a
major commodity, without the excessive restrictions that developed
over time and exist today. A 1791 excise tax on distilled spirits was
the first basis for funding the federal government, 18 and paid off the
debt of the revolutionary war. While new federalists saw liquor as a
commodity that could fund the new government, the whiskey produc-
ers already saw the taxation as excessive government interference
with trade; launching the armed revolt against the federal government
known as the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794.19
Fiscal support of the federal government through taxation of spirits
continued through the civil war. According to the International Ency-
clopedia of Alcohol and Temperance in Modern History, from the time
frame of the "Whiskey Ring frauds (1869-1875) to the period of World
15. Saksa, supra note 14.
16. Distilled Spirits Council 2013 Industry Review, DISCUS 5 (Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://
www.discus.org/assets/1/7/Distilled-SpiritsIndustry-Briefing-Feb-4 2014.pdf [hereinafter Dis-
tilled Spirits Council]; see also Morgan Smith, Alcohol Distribution Laws Bottle Up Options for
Consumers and Retailers, GEORGIA PUBLIC POLICY FOUNDATION (Oct. 16, 2002), http://www.
georgiapolicy.org/alcohol-distribution-laws-bottle-up-options-for-consumers-and-retaiers/.
17. Distilled Spirits Council, supra note 16, at 2.
18. United States Dep't. of Treas. Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau, The TTB Story,
T TB.GoV (May 16, 2012), http://www.ttb.gov/about/history.shtml.
19. Id.
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War One, liquor taxes generated between 20 and 40 percent of federal
revenue annually. '20
The move towards major restriction of alcohol sales began in the
early 1900s with state prohibition laws. In 1913, the passage of the
Webb-Kenyon Act,21 a federal statute that barred interstate shipments
of liquor that violated laws of dry states, was the first federal endorse-
ment of the prohibition movement. Economic issues relating to the
First World War also drove Congress to "shut down the distillery in-
dustry, while President Woodrow Wilson cut grain allotments to brew-
eries and ordered the alcohol content of beer to be reduced to
2.75%. ,"22 Further, upon ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment2 3 in
1913, which allowed the federal government to develop an income tax
system that did not have to be proportionally rationed to states based
on population, the federal government was no longer reliant on the
alcohol excise tax for a large portion of its budget funds.
The Women's Temperance Movement gained traction, and on De-
cember 18, 1917, Congress passed the Eighteenth Amendment to the
U.S Constitution, which outlawed the transport and sale of alcoholic
beverages,2 4 and the states quickly ratified the Amendment.
During the following thirteen years of the Prohibition Era, the fed-
eral government endured extremely high liquor enforcement costs, no
tax revenue from liquor, and increasingly severe economic disaster.
20. 1 ALCOHOL AND TEMPERANCE IN MODERN HISTORY: AN INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPE-
DIA 230 (Jack S. Blocker, Jr., David M. Fahey, & Ian Tyrell eds. 2003).
21. 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2015) (originally enacted in 1913 and reenacted with identical language in
1935).
22. 2 ALCOHOL AND TEMPERANCE IN MODERN HISTORY: AN INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPE-
DIA 440 (Jack S. Blocker, Jr., David M. Fahey, & Ian Tyrell eds. 2003).
23. The Sixteenth Amendment states "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and
without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI. The Sixteenth
Amendment was passed and ratified by the states in response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Pollack v. Farmers' Land & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), in which the Supreme Court declared
certain taxes on income a direct taxes that were not apportioned as required under the Constitu-
tion, and thus unconstitutional.
24. The Eighteenth Amendment read, in relevant part, "the manufacture, sale, or transporta-
tion of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from
the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is
hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933). The Eighteenth Amendment,
and the Volstead Act, which was the enabling legislation, effectively established a national prohi-
bition of alcoholic beverages by making the production, transportation and sale of alcohol ille-
gal. It did not, however, make the consumption of alcohol illegal. During the time of
prohibition, the country saw a major increase in organized crime, corrupt law enforcement, and
public sentiment that violation of the laws as morally and socially acceptable. For example, New
York City had over 30,000 speakeasies (illegal bars) during the time of prohibition. See Teaching
With Documents: The Volstead Act and Related Prohibition Documents, ARCHIVE.OOV, http://
www.archives.gov/education/lessons/volstead-act/ (last visited May 15, 2015).
2015]
440 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:433
President Roosevelt 25 ran, in part, on abolishing the Eighteenth
Amendment, and won. One of his early legislative actions was signing
a bill legalizing the sale and manufacturing of alcohol, prior to the
passage of the Twenty-First Amendment. After thirteen tumultuous
years, Congress passed the Twenty-First Amendment, repealing the
Eighteenth Amendment. Particularly relevant to this article, the
Twenty-First Amendment states:
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or pos-
session of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicat-
ing liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
26
After ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment, the states were
given sweeping authority to regulate alcohol 27 within their borders,
and states enacted a variety of frameworks to address liquor produc-
tion, sale and distribution. Many jurisdictions enacted a three-tier sys-
tem of control, designed to prevent vertical integration of the market.
Specifically, the system required manufacturing, distribution and retail
sales of alcoholic beverages to be under separate ownership. 28 As
long as those regulations set in-state and out-of-state companies on
the same footing, the regulations have generally withstood the test of
time.29
25. Of note, while President Roosevelt pushed through the Twenty-First Amendment to re-
peal Prohibition, the country soon set into place the legacy quota systems that now hamstring
economic development in the industry. These quota systems parallel the comprehensive regula-
tory structures that Roosevelt implemented during his New Deal era, which included regulatory
framework over telecommunication and utility companies, peanut quota systems, taxi medallion
systems and other legacy regulatory frameworks that are not in question. There has been signifi-
cant movement to deregulate a number of those industries, 80 years later.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
27. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (regarding the direct shipment of wine);
State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936) (licensing and fees to import
beer into a state). Since the implementation of the Twenty-First Amendment, repealing the
Eighteenth Amendment, states have attempted to take sole control of the regulation of alcohol.
The courts, however, have consistently noted that the Twenty-First Amendment did not super-
sede other earlier Constitutional sections. In particular, conflict is often seen between the origi-
nal Commerce Clause and the new Twenty-First Amendment. The courts consistently look to
the legal framework developed prior to implementation of prohibition, invoking stare decisis
type considerations even after implementation of the Eighteenth and Twenty-First Amendments,
determining that the Twenty-First Amendment did not overrule legal decisions involving alcohol
made prior to the amendments, but merely added the ability for states to regulate certain aspects
of alcohol sales within their jurisdictions; a particularly interesting model. See Granholm, 544
U.S. at 462.
28. Elyse Grossman & James Mosher, Public Health, State Alcohol Pricing Policies, and the
Dismantling of the 21st Amendment: A Legal Analysis, 15 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 177, 178
(2011) (discussing the shifting alcohol policies); Pamela S. Erickson, Alcohol Deregulation by
Ballot Measure in Washington State, HEALTHY ALCOHOL MARKETPLACE 2 (2014), http://
www.healthyalcoholmarket.com/pdf/Alcohol-Deregulation-by-Ballot-Measure-in Washington
_State.pdf (describing Washington's model and its recent deregulation).
29. See Grossman & Mosher, supra note 28, at 199.
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Such regulation came in tandem with New Deal era regulations for
many industries (which have since de-regulated, unlike the alcohol in-
dustry). For many states, this legacy alcohol regulatory system devel-
opment in the 1930s and 1940s has grown increasingly entrenched and
little effort has been made to modernize the alcohol regulatory
systems.
An on-premise retail establishment 30 is a restaurant, bar, or tavern,
serving beer, wine and spirits on site and by the glass. For on-premise
retail sales licenses, state statutes typically fall into one of three dis-
tinct policies: licenses that are generally open and available without a
numerical limit (such as Georgia and Oregon), licenses that are re-
stricted by location, saturation, or other public policy, and licenses
that are capped on a jurisdictional basis. 31 A number of states imple-
mented a quota system for licensing on-premise retail alcohol sales
establishments.32
This Article addresses the fractured state policy of holding those
legacy licenses to the benefit of the licensee and the detriment of the
following: economic development, increased state revenue, the con-
sumer, and new business owners; and argues that legal jurisprudence
does not support continuing the restrictive legacy markets for on-pre-
mise alcohol sales.
B. Economics of Quota Systems
In all U.S. jurisdictions, no on-premise (by the glass) sales of alco-
hol can be made without proper licensing by the state or local jurisdic-
tion. For states with on-premise alcohol license quota systems, liquor
licenses and the prices on the secondary market are unique to each
state, political subdivision and market area. Thus, new businesses in
states with a quota system must purchase an existing license from a
current licensee in a capped system.
30. For purposes of this Article, the focus is on on-premise licensees who have a full beverage
licenses, which allow the sale of beer, wine and liquor with minimal restrictions. Some jurisdic-
tions have limited beer and/or wine sales licenses, or tasting rooms attached to production facili-
ties. These types of licenses typically have more restrictive sales items and hours and are not at
issue in this Article.
31. See Linda J. Munden, Comment, Retail Liquor License and Due Process: the Creation of
Property Through Regulation, 32 EMORY L.J. 1199, 1209-38 (1983), for a discussion of the three
types of licenses.
32. Premises selling alcohol are subject to specific state statutory requirements, and are also
subject to concurrent federal requirements as set out in 27 C.F.R. pt. 646 (relating to alcohol and
tobacco). The specifics of licensing requirements are generally subject to the state laws, while
the federal laws set out certain advertising limitations for all alcohol industry members, as well
as tax and bonding requirements for production facilities. See id.
2015]
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In most states with quota systems for on-premise licenses, the prices
vary based on a particular local market, not a state-wide basis. This
variation in market value stems from the desirability of a location,
driving the market value of purchasing a license from an existing li-
cense holder. According to Jim Saksa, a license in parts of New Jersey
costs as much as $1.6 million, and in parts of Philadelphia, $200,000,
and $450,000 in Massachusetts. 33 Heading west, Utah recently al-
lowed for a secondary market for licenses, and anticipates license sales
may be about $1 million, which is the equivalent to a license in Mon-
tana and New Mexico. 34 The funds for a new owner to purchase an
existing license is typically leveraged or purchased with extensive
mortgage requirements. Existing owners also use the value of their
license as collateral to expand their business, and are active politically
to protect their interests in the regulatory system.35
Such a licensing system has been called a "regulatory capture; '36 an
economic theory arguing that regulatory agencies, originally created
to act in the public interest, instead transform into agencies advancing
the commercial or special concerns of interest groups that dominate
the industry or sector the regulatory agencies are charged with regu-
lating.37 Regulatory capture is a form of government failure; it creates
an opening for firms to behave in ways injurious to the public (e.g.,
producing negative externalities). For alcohol licensing, the laws are
both entrenched and archaic, and have set up a system where licen-
sees have such value in the existing market that the regulators are
politically disincentivized to change the system, which is to the detri-
ment of the public.
C. Particular Markets as Examples of Economic Effects of
Quota Systems
In Montana, news agencies report that new businesses cannot open
because the cost of a liquor license is prohibitive. For example, the
33. Saksa, supra note 14.
34. Id. The Montana Department of Revenue publishes the sales data for any sale of an all-
beverage license, which can be accessed the Department's website. See Montana Dep't. of Rev-
enue, Purchase Price Report, REVENUE.MT.GOV, http://revenue.mt.gov/Portals/9/11252014_ .pdf
(last visited May 15, 2015). Montana all-beverage license holders may also have limited gam-
bling, which may distort market prices.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990), for a discussions of regula-
tory capture. See also Ernesto Dal Bo, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. OF
ECON. POL'Y 2 (2006); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Deci-
sion-Making: A Theory of Regulatory, 106 Q. J. ECON. 4 (1991).
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Flathead Beacon, a Montana newspaper, reported in October of 2104,
business owner Melanie Cross planned to open a pub-style restaurant
in downtown Kalispell, the tourist community that is a gateway to
Glacier National Park. City officials supported the proposal, but
Cross was unable to purchase a retail liquor license.38 Montana has a
state-wide quota system, based on population of major cities, 39 and
there were no licenses available in downtown Kalispell. 40 The most
recent sale of an all-beverage license in Kalispell occurred in July
2014, for $500,000.41 Every major city in Montana has exceeded its
allotted quota through mechanisms which grandfathered certain li-
censes or allowed floater licenses to be moved to metropolitan areas.
The Flathead Beacon reports Kalispell City Planners have been
working for the past few years to re-energize the downtown area, and
a unified message among business owners is that more restaurants and
bars are needed.42 The Montana Tavern Association, the lobbying
arm of the current licensees vehemently opposes any effort to expand
or eliminate the quota system.43
Massachusetts is a state with a hybrid on-premise alcohol license
quota system. There is a state-wide quota system for package stores
and retail on-premise licenses which a city or community can opt out
of by petition. 44 As of 2013, 25 communities have opted out, with
several community leaders considering it.45 Generally, however, news
reports indicate the communities are split on whether increasing the
number of licenses is a positive or negative. A Massachusetts business
journal reports that while certain business owners note that "not hav-
ing a license limitation for on-premise consumption is part of a gener-
38. Dillon Tabish, Liquor License Lockdown, FLATHEAD BEACON (Oct. 15, 2014), available at
http://flatheadbeacon.com/2014/10/15/liquor-license-lockdown/.
39. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-4-201.
40. Tabish, supra note 38.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. The Montana Tavern Association has consistently taken the lobbying position that the
quota system is a good one, and that it should not be expanded. Hearing on H.B. 336 Before the
H. Comm. On Bus. and Labor, 64th Leg. (Mon. 2015) (statement of John Iverson, Montana
Tavern Association lobbyist). See also Not Familiar with the MTA?, MONTANA TAVERN Associ-
ATION, http://montanatavernassociation.com/ (touting the benefits of the quota system); Alexan-
der Deedy, Liquor License Capped Out: Montana at Limit Under Quota System, HELENA
INDEPENDENT RECORD (Jan. 25, 2015; 6:00 AM), available at http://helenair.com/news/local/
liquor-licenses-capped-out-montana-at-limit-under-quota-system/article-e9f5928-033c-5e49-801
d-bla85935b4b1.html.
44. Taryn Plumb, Communities Split over Recent Push to Lift Quotas on Bar Permits,
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alized economic development" another noted that "I don't think we
should, in effect, try to hurt those who are already in business. '46
In contrast, states with less restrictive alcohol licensing laws have an
unrestricted number of restaurant and bar businesses that are flourish-
ing. Oregon does not have a quota system, and a license to sell liquor,
beer, or wine costs $402 per year.47 There is no secondary market for
the license; nor is one needed. The hospitality and alcohol industry is
booming, the regulatory framework is robust, and there is no indica-
tion that more social or public safety issues exist than in quota states.
Wineries, breweries and distilleries in Oregon lead the nation in terms
of craft and expertise.
The Oregon Liquor Control Commission reports that is has issued
more than 135,600 server permits, has "mandatory alcohol server edu-
cation," and was the "first state to require server education in 1987."48
The Commission has 12,852 annual licenses; 6,855 of those are on-
premise licenses (the remainder are off-premise licenses issued to con-
venience or grocery stores, wineries, breweries, distributors and distill-
ers).49 Oregon's liquor Commission notes that Oregon generates $8.8
billion in tourism revenue each year, and that, as of 2010, the beer
industry generated $2.4 billion, while the wine industry generated
$158.5 million.50 Additionally, theft of liquor in Oregon was a mere
.003% (or $7,680) in Fiscal Year 2012.51
Comparing areas with on-premise alcohol quota systems, the high
cost of entering the market has become a consistent negative effect on
the economic development of downtown areas and popular tourist lo-
cations. In recent years, with the development of an American craft
beer and spirits industry and a resurgence of classic cocktails, consum-
ers, economic development members, and politicians are beginning to
consider the need for modernization of alcohol restrictions.
The current owners of the legacy licenses continue, however, to ex-
ert political and legal pressure to protect their entrenched positions.
Politically, licensees argue to continue the status quo. When other
markets faced an opening of the regulatory structure, the market par-
ticipants brought takings claims to control their prior hold on the mar-
ket. Under current regulatory takings jurisprudence, on-premise
46. Id.
47. Tabish, supra note 38. See also Saksa, supra note 14.
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alcohol licensees are likely to bring a takings claim if the markets are
opened, however, this Article argues that such claims are likely to ulti-
mately be unsuccessful.
III. PROPERTY INTEREST AND REGULATORY TAKINGS CLAIMS
WHEN THE GOVERNMENT AFFECTS MARKET CHANGE
THROUGH EXPANSION
This Article 52 focuses on challenging the validity of the takings ar-
gument made by the current licensees who are attempting to politi-
cally and legally control the exclusivity of their market place. 53
The Constitution, courts, and legal scholars consistently note that
reasonable limiting principles are necessary in order to encourage de-
sirable governmental regulation without bankrupting national trea-
52. This Article addresses solely the takings claim in these types of cases. There are several
other lines of alleging an impairment of contracts claim against a governmental entity when a
statute renders certain licensed activities prohibited or severely restricted. Those cases bear sim-
ilar legal arguments and can be illustrative in reviewing legal trends in licenses as property. See,
e.g., Hawkeye Commodity Promotions, Inc. v. Vilsack, 486 F.3d 430, 440 (8th Cir. 2007) (denying
an impairment of contract claim for use of gaming machines after legislature abolished specific
style of gaming); Yellow Cab Co. v. City of Chi., 3 F. Supp 2d 919 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that
the contract clause prevents impairments but not full breach of contract when ordinance nega-
tively affected prior settlement). Further, analysis of definition and valuation of property, in-
cluding intangible values such as goodwill in eminent domain cases may be of value in the
analysis of a license as property in a takings claim. See, e.g., Brian A. Lee, Just Undercompensa-
tion: The Ideosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 614-15 (2013).
Additionally, the definition of a license as property when looking at due process requirements
may also be of interest. See Linda J. Munden, supra note 31. In addition, an interesting line of
cases addresses economic liberties, and the right to pursue one's livelihood. Such claims may be
a methodology or consideration for challenge to the legacy license system. See, e.g., Santos v.
City of Houston, 852 F. Supp 601, 608 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (finding the owner of a jitney service
could not be precluded from competing with taxi companies); conflicting decisions in sale of
caskets by those other than licensed funeral directors in Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658,
666 (E.D. Tenn. 2000), affd, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002) and Powers v. Harris, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26939 (W.D. Okla. 2002) affd, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004). See STEVEN J. EAGLE,
REGULATORY TAKINGS 60-61 (4th ed. 2009), for further analysis.
53. This Article does not directly address all of the research relating to societal dangers tied to
increased on-premise licensees selling into a market. The research, however, generally shows
that any concern about the increased access to on-premise alcohol by the glass can be combated
by an increased enforcement of current regulations. Increasing the number of on-premise sales
locations should generate increased licensing revenue to allow the government to eliminate bad
actors in the industry. Additionally, the government will not face pressure to remove bad actors
from the market when the market will allow for new actors to enter. Also, the research data
shows that accessing alcohol in moderation may be beneficial in preventing the greatest societal
danger of alcohol intake: overconsumption in a single instance. See Paul J. Gruenwald, Regulat-
ing Availability: How Access to Alcohol Affects Drinking and Problems in Youth and Adults, 34
ALCOHOL RESEARCH AND HEALTH 248, 248 (2011). See Distilled Spirits Council, supra note 16,
for data relating to the advantages of alcohol consumption in moderation.
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sury.54 There is little doubt that the founding fathers of the U.S. legal
system would not have considered the extent of the use of the Takings
Clause; originally envisioned to prevent the Government's "actual
physical seizure of private property" without just compensation. 55
How does the economics of opening up a restricted market interplay
with courts' consideration of a takings claim in a licensing case?
There is a rich history of the framework for regulatory takings in a
variety of contexts, as well as a long history of takings claims in the
physical use of alcohol licenses. There is not, however, much legal
precedent relating to a regulatory taking in the value of the alcohol
license itself, even though the value of the licenses may range upwards
of millions of dollars.56
The term regulatory taking is the legal shorthand for the gray area
between regulations and takings.5 7 Not surprisingly, one of the early
regulatory takings cases (1887) involved the regulation of alcohol. In
Mugler v. Kansas,58 a brewery owner argued a taking of his property
when a law was passed that prohibited the manufacturing of beer.
The U.S. Supreme Court determined that regulations under the police
power were not compensable under the Fifth Amendment.59 It was
not until 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon60 when the Court ex-
panded its view of the Takings Clause to include regulatory actions.61
54. See U.S CONST., art. V; see also GEOFFREY STONE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 971 (4th ed.
2001).
55. ROBERT MELTZ, DwiGTrr MERRIAM & RICK FRANK, THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 129-30 nn.2-4
(1999) (citing J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doc-
trine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 91-96 (1995); Joseph Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE
L.J. 36, 58-60 (1964); William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995); William M. Treanor, The Original Significance
of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L.J. 694 (1985)). Cf Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-15 (1992) with id. at 1055-60 (Blackmun, J.
dissenting).
56. See Saksa, supra note 14.
57. EAGLE, supra note 54, at 5.
58. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
59. Id. at 675.
60. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). There is some debate whether regulatory takings cases may have
developed prior to Pennsylvania Coal. See TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 1, 4 n.22 (Thomas E. Roberts, ed. 2002).
61. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. There are a variety of takings claims not directly
addressed in this Article, including physical takings, total regulatory takings, partial regulatory
takings or a land-use extraction. In 2005, the Supreme Court clarified in Lingle v Chevron, that
"a plaintiff seeking to challenge a government regulation as an uncompensated taking of private
property may proceed under one of the other theories . . . - by alleging a 'physical' taking, a
Lucas-type 'total regulatory taking,' a Penn Central taking, or a land-use exaction violating the
standards set forth in Nollan and Dolan." Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548
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The seminal 1978 case, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City, governs partial regulatory takings cases such as restrictions
on private property use by directing an ad hoc analysis of particular
facts.62 In Penn Central, the City of New York designated Grand Cen-
tral Station as a historic landmark, thus requiring the owner to seek
municipal permission for any changes to the structure. 63 Penn Cen-
tral's owner then leased the airspace above the station to a developer
who intended to build a large office building.64 The City denied the
required permits. 65 The Court noted that takings issues are a "prob-
lem of considerable difficulty" and that no set formula could deter-
mine when economic injuries caused by public action were to be
compensated by the government.66
The Court stated that an ad hoc factual inquiry was required and
put forth three factors for consideration. Those factors which have
"particular significance" are: first, "the economic impact of the regula-
tion on claimant"; second, its interference with reasonable "invest-
ment-backed expectations"; and third, "the character of the
governmental action."'67
Under the above analysis, the Court determined that the partial ec-
onomic impact was not significant, and that the relevant measure and
that the railroad was able to earn a reasonable rate of return.68 Penn
Central is a seminal case for much takings jurisprudence. 69 Steven Ea-
gle provides in his book Regulatory Takings, that it is important to
note that "the notion of free competition permeates the common law
and is marked by the judicial refusal to award damages for engaging in
competitive behavior. ' 70 As determined by the cases discussed below,
the courts, however, do not focus on all of the factors set out in Penn
(2005). See also Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (1967).
62. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
63. Id. at 115-16.
64. Id. at 116.
65. Id.
66. Id at 123-24.
67. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
68. Id. at 136. The Court later addressed the regulatory taking in Tahoe Sierra Preservation
Council v. Tahoe Reg'I Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002) (noting that analysis "necessarily entails
complex factual assessment of the purposes and economic effects of government action"). See
also Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (looking at "the extent to which the regulation
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government
action").
69. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, Shawn Deery, Sally Peace & John P. Fougerousse, Do Own-
ers have a Fair Chance of Prevailing Under the Ad Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central
Transportation Company?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL'Y F., 121 (2003-2004).
70. EAGLE, supra note 54, at 506.
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Central, but rather focus solely on the third; the character of govern-
mental action.
The Supreme Court in Lucas v. SC Coastal cautions that without
the Takings Clause, personal property may be rendered "economically
worthless. ' 71 Does the takings requirement need to have some level
of commitment in the property by the government? 72 And how does
that interplay with the Lockean ideal that one's labor serves as proxy
for property rights? Is it possible, as a market opens up, for the licen-
see to protect the value of one's labor in a court of law? Or is it only
possible for the licensee to compete in the free market?
While the Supreme Court notes that personal property can, of
course, be wiped out without compensation, the ultimate holding in
Lucas allows for opportunities for property to be valuable, protected,
and ultimately paid for by the government when the government in-
terferes with the marketplace and the valuable asset of private prop-
erty. In contrast, there is no constitutional right to be free from
competition, let alone a right to force the government to pay an entity
when the market forces allow competitors into an open market. The
Constitution is meant to protect people from the government unrea-
sonably restricting their right to earn an honest living. It is not a tool
for entrenched businesses to shut down entrepreneurs offering a bet-
ter service for a lower price.
When consumers push political entities to open the regulated liquor
markets, what cost will be incurred in the transition to an open market
and who will ultimately bear that economic effect? The current li-
cense holders are the stumbling block for positive economic change.
Their political strength has allowed them to raise the legal red herring
of a valid takings claim when the government eliminates a quota
system.
A. Review of Legal Characteristics of On-Premise Licenses
Licensees claim that, for all purposes, their license is worth the price
sold on the open market, including a Fifth Amendment takings claim
for compensation if the market is opened to other players. In review-
ing some of the various courts' treatment of takings in the context of
alcohol licenses and the restriction of those licenses by governmental
71. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992); see also Peoples
Super Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Jenkins, 432 F Supp. 2d 200, 215 (D. Mass. 2006) (noting that the
Supreme Court "cautioned [private property] could be wiped out without triggering the stric-
tures of the Takings Clause"); Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602 (1993); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960).
72. See Susan Eisenberg, Note, Intangible Rights, 60 VAND. L. REV 667, 681 (2007).
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interference,73 the majority of cases and scholarly work relating to li-
quor licenses have either focused on the property aspects in relation
to due process analysis74 or takings in the context of zoning cases.
Numerous cases in a variety of jurisdictions have addressed takings
claims and alcohol licenses. Typically those cases relate to classic zon-
ing restrictions of the use of a retail-sales alcohol license. In analyzing
the property aspects of liquor licenses in a takings claims relating spe-
cifically to zoning, trends indicate that a full restriction of use of li-
cense will likely trigger a cognizable takings claim.75
While there is some validity in that claim when the government re-
stricts the use of a license (such as a zoning claim), and the plaintiffs
have a reasonable expectation of a successful takings claim, review of
relevant case law indicates there is not however, a valid claim for the
value of the license when the market deregulates or opens to addi-
tional market players.
While it is generally straightforward to consider the property char-
acteristics of tangible items or real property, including the right to ob-
tain, the right to alienate, or considerations of transferability or
exclusivity, a government issued license may grant some of those
rights (or not) and may also carry others, such as right to renew or
state's right to revoke.76 Might a license be a property right but yet
not be a property right that can also have a compensable takings claim
attached to it? There are several lines of legal property theories that
may help to determine some of these questions. For example, a li-
cense may be akin to a franchise right, such of that in City of Oakland
73. Burden of proof is on the plaintiff within any takings context. See Florida Rock Indus. v.
United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (analyzing burden of proof in a partial takings
claim).
74. See, e.g., Shelley Ross Saxer, License to Sell: Constitutional Protection Against State or
Local Government Regulation of Liquor Licensing, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441 (1994-1995)
(addressing substantive due process and equal protection claims in relation to governmental
control over liquor licenses).
75. See San Antonio v, El Dorado Amusement Co., 195 S.W.3d 238, 246 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).
Plaintiffs argue a takings claim when zoning eliminated ability to run nightclub under current
license. Id. at 243. San Antonio claims a legitimate use of police powers. Id. at 244. The court
noted that a "regulatory taking" uses an ad hoc factual inquiry. Id. San Antonio says taking
requires "physical invasion" and "denies owner all economically beneficial or productive use of
the land or interferes with the landowner's rights to use and enjoy its property." Id. at 24 (citing
Sheffield Dev. Co v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 677 (Tex. 2004); Mayhew v. Town of
Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 936 (Tex. 1998)). However, if ordinance has prevented the most
profitable use, such action does not conclusively establish taking. See Taub v. City of Deer Park,
882 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. 1994); see also Lowenberg v. City of Dallas, 168 S.W. 3d 800, 802 (Tex.
2005).
76. See Munden, supra note 31, for a discussion of these issues in relation to alcohol licenses.
See also Saxer, supra note 63.
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v. Oakland Raiders.77 Or such license may have more of a personal
property aspect to it, or might it be like a benefit 78 that is a statutory
entitlement that requires due process to eliminate but not rise to the
level to allow a taking.79 In the cases mentioned in this Article, the
courts address some aspects of the property notion of a license. How-
ever, the ultimate decision rests on the governmental action; the gov-
ernmental right to change a regulatory structure. Thus, while it is
important to understand the scope of property interests for licensing,
ultimately the courts focus the question on governmental action, and
no license has yet risen to the level of property that triggers a compen-
sable Fifth Amendment takings claim when the government opens a
restricted or capped market.
B. The Economics of Opening a Closed Market and Its
Effects on Licensees
The New Deal era imposed comprehensive regulation on a variety
of U.S. industries. Regulators, consumers, and businesses have
pushed to deregulate many of those industries since that time, includ-
ing interstate trucking, air transport, electric utility, and telecommuni-
cations industries.
For large scale industries subject to deregulation in a market, such
as trucking and air transport, tangible assets could be redeployed to
differing markets to service demand. For other large-scale industries,
a shift from monopolies to open competitive markets, with use of
fixed immobile assets such as utility plants, shifted the value structure
of those companies. Significant analysis is available for the advan-
tages8 ° and disadvantages of deregulation of large-scale industries. 81
77. 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982).
78. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 275 (1970).
79. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55 (1986). See
Hage v. United States, 51 Fed Cl. 570 (2002), for a discussion of plaintiffs' rights in their grazing
permits, and whether change in the permit system triggers a Fifth Amendment taking.
80. Arguments have been made that deregulation without accounting for "stranded costs"
constitutes a deregulatory taking. Compare Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Im-
provident Regulatory Bargains, 108 YALE L.J. 801 (1999), and J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F.
Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U L. REV. 851
(1996), with Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory Bargains,
108 YALE L.J. 801 (1999). Courts have not yet adopted a deregulatory takings approach, but it
has been referenced by courts in telecom cases. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525
U.S. 366, 411 (1999); U.S. West v. M.N. Pub. Util. Commc'n, 55 F. Supp 2d 968, 987 (D. Minn
1999).
81. Economic analysis has addressed whether there is an argument as to whether considera-
tion should be given to the imbalance that occurs when a regulatory taking creates an economic
windfall or benefit to other group, which could be termed a regulatory "giving." See DEAN
MISCZYNSKI & DONALD HAGMAN, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND
ALCOHOL LICENSES UNDER A QUOTA SYSTEM
There is less analysis of the effects on opening markets when the
licenses are local and held by individuals or small corporations. It has
only been in the last decade that certain areas such as individual leg-
acy licenses have been subject to political, economic and consumer
driven movement to open up the markets. In this instance of nega-
tively affecting the economic value of licenses of smaller corporations
and individuals, does that change the economic analysis or the ex-
pected treatment of those industries by the court systems?
When markets are opened to the financial detriment of current li-
cense holders, are there any legal remedies available? The cases ad-
dressed in this Article focus on industries where the licenses are held
by individuals, or used by individuals and small corporations, instead
of a deregulation that is affecting only a handful of corporate entities.
To date, for a case in which an individual licensee's value in that li-
cense is restricted, or partially restricted by the governmental action,
courts typically analyze the economic impact of the regulation, its in-
terference with reasonable investment backed expectation of profit
and the character of the governmental actions 82 as set out in the Su-
preme Court's Penn Central case.
What considerations must be analyzed to determine when reviewing
a government issued license and considering a non-compensable regu-
lation is compared to a compensable taking for opening a market?
The ad hoc factual test set out in Penn Central (considering the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable in-
vestment backed expectation of profit and the character of the
governmental actions) provides little framework to give license hold-
ers or regulators a basis to determine when a jurisdiction or judge may
find a compensable taking. The court must look to whether a plaintiff
possesses a property interest, and if so, what is the scope of that inter-
est, and finally, even if a property interest exists, does it rise to one
which allows the plaintiff to make a claim that such property has been
taken, and as such compensation is required? Unfortunately for cur-
rent license holders, any factual analysis provides little certainty as to
COMPENSATION (1978). See also ROBERT MELTZ, DWIGHT MERRIAM & RICK FRANK, THE TAK-
INGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULA-
TION 159 (1999); Donald Elliot, Givings and Takings, 48 LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIG. 1, 3
(1996).
82. Courts note that "Regulatory Takings" can occur when significant restriction is placed
upon owner's use of his property for which justice and fairness require compensation. See, e.g.,
Pharm. Care Mgmt. Assoc. v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 306 (1st Cir. 2005). A court should analyze
the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed ex-
pectations, and the character of the governmental action. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S.164, 175 (1979).
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the chances of prevailing. Further, the recent cases relating to open-
ing closed markets focus on the ability of the government to set or
change parameters for the market.
IV. ANALOGOUS CASES OF LICENSE AS PROPERTY
IN TAKINGS CLAIMS
There are many philosophical, legal and economic definitions of
property.8 3 For purposes of examining a regulatory taking, "the con-
cept that property is a system of rules that govern access to and con-
trol material resources"8 4 provides a framework for consideration of
licenses and their property aspects. The Supreme Court notes that
property rights are not created by the Constitution, but rather created
and defined by "existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law[.]"8 5
There is no doubt that a license in a closed market will have eco-
nomic value, and that there is an "economic impact"8 6 on a license
after a regulatory change. While statutory construction is variable in
each jurisdiction, trends generally base the compensable nature of a
property right in a license situation on the right to obtain, right to
alienate, right to renew and the state's right to revoke. 87 If a property
owner, however, has an expansive property right which can be com-
83. To even describe or define property goes beyond the scope of this Article. As the Court
stated in Florida Rocks Indus. v. United States,
[p]roperty interests are about as diverse as the human mind can conceive. Property
interests may be real and personal, tangible and intangible, possessory and nonposses-
sory. They can be defined in terms of sequential rights to possession (present interests-
life estates and various types of fees - and future interests), and in terms of shared
interests (such as various types of co-ownership). There are specially structured prop-
erty interests (such as those of a mortgagee, lessee, bailee adverse possessor) and there
are interests in special kinds of things (such as water, and commercial contracts.
18 F.3d 1560, 1572 n.32 (Fed. Cir .1994).
84. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 31 (1988); EAGLE, supra note 54.
85. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
86. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
87. Saxer analyzes these specific rights in her law review article, as does Linda Munden. See
Munden, supra note 31; Saxer, supra note 63. The cases relating to takings claims do not have
the same linear analysis as the law review articles noted, but generally consider the same type of
rights when looks at an ad hoc factual analysis under Lucas. Since states differ on whether their
licenses may be treated as property, and may even be treated as property in some instances but
not others. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Saugen, 169 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn. 1969) ("It is submitted that
whenever the legislature has made licenses assignable or transferable, and the transfer can be
effected with the consent of the authorities to anyone qualifying under the statute, the property
element in the license is sufficiently recognized to warrant its exposure to seizure by the credi-
tors of the license."). This can be contrasted with the Minnesota taxi medallion case that distin-
guished Saugen by noting that Saugen was a complete revocation of a license, in comparison to
amending the licensing structure to allow more participants in a limited market. Minneapolis
Taxi Owners Coalition, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 572 F.3d 502, 507-08 (8th Cir. 2009).
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pensated by the government upon a mere change in zoning laws, how
is it then possible that there could be no takings claim if the govern-
ment immediately sets those license values to zero via the legislative
or regulatory process of opening a market?
In a regulatory context, courts note that a licensee in the on-pre-
mise alcohol sales arena who makes expenditures should be held to
know that the revocable nature of the license and act upon their own
risk. 88 What is the line however, for determining whether a license is
revocable or not? And when the government must consider whether
that license now attaches some level of liability if the government acts
to infringe upon it, not by narrowing the market, but by expanding the
market?
Licenses in a jurisdiction with a quota system are arguably both
more valuable and also more likely to be considered property, as they
have a higher level of exclusivity and transferability. While there are
many cases that suggest that an alcohol license may be property, or at
least have value, there is yet no case law that addresses whether there
is a viable argument that a legacy license under the quota system has
property value that rises to the level that would require compensation
under the takings regime. There are, however, several similar cases
that provide some framework for consideration.
A. Grazing and Assault Weapons
The U.S. Supreme Court has evaluated a variety of other regulatory
frameworks when determining whether a governmental permits and
licenses give rise to property interests, which are protected by the
Fifth Amendment. To begin, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined
that express statutory language may prevent the formation of a pro-
tectable property interest.89 In some states, alcohol licenses may have
specific statutory language, which may prevent a licensee from assert-
ing an expectation of property interest in the license. In those in-
stances, those licensees are likely to know that their licenses do not
have the hallmarks of a valuable property interest.
Many jurisdictions have legacy on-premise alcohol licenses in which
the statutory language does not address the property interest. With-
out express statutory language, courts have looked to the "hallmark
88. See, e.g., Larson v. Amundson, 414 N.W.2d 413, 418-19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing
respondent to deny access to property).
89. See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973) (Supreme Court refused to recognize
property interest in grazing permits based on statutory language setting "congressional intent
that no compensable property right be created"); see also Peanut Quota Holders Assoc. v.
United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 1330 (2005) (citing Fuller, 409 U.S. at 494).
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rights" of transferability and excludability as part of the bundle of
property rights 90 when the government restricts use of a license.
The majority of the court cases note that benefits that individuals
derive from the government generally do not rise to compensable
levels - whether looking solely at the governmental action or the li-
censee's expectation of profit. Judicial review of grazing permits illus-
trates this point.91 In McKinley v. United States, a grazing permittee
sued to set aside a U.S. Forest Service reduction in the number of
cattle allowed to graze on the permittee's national forest lease.
In McKinley the District Court noted:
While the Court does not doubt that the modification of appellant's
[grazing] permit has a negative effect on the value of his base prop-
erty and the viability of his ranching operation, the value added to
his property by his holding the permit is clearly a 'benefit and privi-
lege bestowed by the government[.]'... 'Although the permits are
valuable to ranchers, they are not an interest protected by the Fifth
Amendment against taking by the government who granted them
with the understanding that they could be withdrawn ... without
payment of compensation. 92
The Court held that the value added to the permittee's property
was "a benefit and privilege bestowed by the government," and "[n]o
compensable taking" of permittee's private property occurred. 93
Under a Penn Central analysis of the investment backed expecta-
tion that may occur when a plaintiff relies on a government issued
permit, the Court in Mitchell Arms Inc. v. U.S. notes that when a citi-
zen voluntarily enters into a market subject to pervasive government
control he cannot be said to possess the right to exclude.94 In Mitchell
Arms, a firearms importer sued the United States alleging that suspen-
sion and subsequent revocation of import permits for assault rifles was
a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.95
Mitchell Arms imported assault rifles under a federal permit for
several years. Under new rules, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire-
arms and Explosives ("ATF") suspended and ultimately revoked
90. Peanut Quota Holders, 421 F.3d at 1330; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36 (1982) (describing the right to dispose of property as part of an
individual's bundle of property rights); see, e.g., Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379
F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
91. See, e.g., Fuller, 409 U.S. at 494.
92. McKinley v. United States, 828 F. Supp 888, 893 (D.N.M 1993) (quoting Pankey Land &
Cattle Co. v. Hardin, 427 F.2d 43, 44 (10th Cir. 1970)).
93. Id.
94. Mitchell Arms, Inc. v. United States, 7 F.3d 212, 216 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
95. Id. at 215.
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Mitchell Arms' permits to import. 96 A number of assault rifles were
seized by customs when the permits were suspended. 97 Mitchell Arms
argued that the contractual relationship to import those assault rifles,
based on reliance of the federal permit, gave rise to a reasonable in-
vestment backed expectation protected by the Fifth Amendment.98
The Federal Circuit Court ultimately disagreed and held that the frus-
tration of the importers' financial expectation by revocation of the
permit was not a Fifth Amendment taking.99
B. Peanut Quota Holders and Quota Licenses
The issues for determining whether a valid regulatory takings claim
in a legacy or closed market are set out in Members of the Peanut
Quota Holders Assoc., Inc. v. United States.100 In Peanut Quota Hold-
ers, the government provided certain limited peanut growing allot-
ments, and advantageous financing for those holding peanut quotas,
with penalties for peanut growers who do not hold quota licenses. 1°1
The peanut quota system has been in effect since the New Deal era,
and the peanut quotas have significant value.'0 2
In 2002, the federal government passed the Farm Security and Ru-
ral Investment Act of 2002, which required that holders of the peanut
quotas must actually farm the quotas.10 3 Previously, holders of the
quotas leased the quotas to other farmers, creating a secondary mar-
ket. Farmers who leased their peanut quotas to other farmers brought
suit against the U.S. alleging that the elimination of their quotas con-
stituted a regulatory taking. 10 4
After reviewing the transferability and exclusivity of the quotas, the
court ultimately held that the Peanut Farmers have a property interest
in their license.'05 The case notes that
[t]he salient difference between the licenses in the noted cases and
the peanut quota allotment is that the value of the peanut quota is
considerably more concrete. A license represents a limited suspen-
sion of the otherwise general restrictions imposed by the govern-
ment-in the case of a fishing license, it is merely a representation
by the government that it will not interfere with the licensee's ef-
96. Id. at 214.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Mitchell Arms, 7 F.3d at 217.
100. 421 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
101. Id. at 1326.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1325.
104. Id.
105. Peanut Quota Holders, 421 F.3d at 1335-36.
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forts to catch fish. The number of licenses to be issued under such a
scheme is not fixed. Each additional license dilutes the value of the
previously issued licenses. So long as the government retains the
discretion to determine the total number of licenses issued, the
number of market entrants is indeterminate. Such a license is by its
very nature not exclusive. Neither the fisherman nor the firearms
salesman can exclude later licensees from entering the market, in-
creasing competition, and thereby diminishing the value of his
license.10 6
The Peanut Quota Holders thus notes that a compensable interest in
property is indicated by the following factors: "express statutory lan-
guage precluding the formation of a property right in combination
with the presence of the right to transfer and the right to exclude."'' 0 7
While Peanut Quota Holders articulates the above standard, it then
denies the takings claim with the following:
The question, therefore, is not whether the peanut quotas have as-
pects of property, but whether Congress must pay the owners of
peanut quotas compensation when it takes steps that render the
quotas less valuable, or even valueless. The answer is no, because
the property interest represented by the peanut quota is entirely the
product of a government program unilaterally extending benefits to
the quota holders, and nothing in the terms of the statute indicated
that the benefits could not be altered or extinguished at the govern-
ment's election. 10 8
The Peanut Quota Holders uses the analogy:
food stamps in the hands of food stamp recipients are property.
Theft or fraud that deprived the owner of food stamps would surely
be punishable as theft or fraud directed at property. But, the gov-
ernment's decision to terminate the food stamp program before the
food stamps could be issued would not give rise to an obligation to
compensate prospective holders of the stamps.'0 9
The court applies the same principle to the peanut quotas such that
"peanut quotas are property, but they are a form of property that is
subject to alteration or elimination by changes in the government pro-
gram that gave them value." 110 The Eighth Circuit found the quotas
are a privilege and "holders of peanut quotas, like the holders of food
stamps, have no legally protected right against the government's mak-
106. Id. at 1333-34.
107. Id. at 1331 (citing Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1374
(Fed. Cir. 2004); Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1341-42 (2002); Mitchell Arms, Inc. v.
United States, 7 F.3d 212, 216 (Fed. Cir. 1993); United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973)).
108. Id. at 1334.
109. Id.
110. Peanut Quota Holders, 421 F.3d at 1334.
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ing changes in the underlying program and no right to compensation
for the loss in value resulting from the changes."11 '
The Peanut Quota Holders notes that the government is "free to
create programs that convey benefits in the form of property, but, un-
less the statute itself or surrounding circumstances indicate that such
conveyances are intended to be irrevocable, the government does not
forfeit its right to withdraw those benefits or qualify them as it
chooses. ' 112 Citing to Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrap-
ment,113 Peanut Quota Holders notes that
Congress at all times retains the ability to amend statutes, a power
which inheres in its authority to legislate, Congress at all times re-
tains the right to revoke legislatively created entitlements. In this
case, the Court finds that there is nothing to suggest that the peanut
quota program was intended to provide irrevocable benefits to
quota holders.1 14
The court found that the question is not "whether the peanut quo-
tas have aspects of property, but whether Congress must pay the own-
ers of peanut quotas compensation when it takes steps that render
quotas less valuable, or even valueless. 11 5 It noted the "answer is no,
because the property interest represented by peanut quota is entirely
the product of a government program unilaterally extending benefits
to the quota holders, and nothing in the terms of the statute indicted
that the benefits could not be altered or extinguished at the govern-
ment's election."' 1 6
Could a license holder still have an expectation of a compensable
property right under the takings clause? When the Eighth Circuit
notes in Peanut Quota Holders, "[t]he government is free to create
111. Id. at 1334-35 (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 604 (1987) ("Congress is not, by
virtue of having instituted a social welfare program, bound to continue it....
112. Id. at 1335. The Peanut Court continues with an
explanation of why government termination of such a program does not give rise to a
right of compensation has been stated in different ways at different times. It is some-
times said that the property holder's rights in the property have not "vested"; it is
sometimes said that the property holder has no investment-backed expectation of
maintaining a continued right to the property, and it is sometimes said that the property
is in the form of a gratuity that the government has explicitly or implicitly retained the
right to alter or revoke. Each of these characterizations captures the essence of the
reason the government's action does not give rise to a constitutional duty of
compensation....
Id. (internal citations omitted).
113. Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986) (not-
ing that courts should be "extremely reluctant" to construe statues in a manner that forecloses
the ability of Congress to exercise its legislative powers).
114. Peanut Quota Holders, 421 F.3d at 1335.
115. Id. at 1334.
116. Id.
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programs that convey benefits in the form of property, but, unless the
statute itself or surrounding circumstances indicate that such convey-
ances are intended to be irrevocable, the government does not forfeit
its right to withdraw those benefits or qualify them as it chooses," 117
the statement appears to make clear that a licensee has little right to
expect compensation when the statutory framework changes and de-
values his or her investment, which has value in a secondary market.
Peanut Quota Holders is analogous to the alcohol licensing cases in
the sense that those peanut quota licenses were legacy licenses set up
in the New Deal era, provided some level of exclusivity and transfera-
bility, and ultimately had a great financial value to the holders of
those licenses. The licenses had essentially created a secondary mar-
ket by the licensees themselves, which the government moved to
eliminate.
This case indicates that the consideration of whether the govern-
ment can change the regulatory system is the sole issue for considera-
tion in a case where devaluation of a license occurred after
government action. Such an outcome indicates that any other test, or
even a factual inquiry under Penn Central is likely irrelevant when the
government may change a licensing system.
C. Analyzing Taxi Medallions: A Legacy Licensing System
While we can extrapolate much legal analysis from peanut legacy
quota system and regulatory structure of opening a market under
Mitchell, recent taxi medallion cases provide the closest parallel to the
legal analysis for opening the market for alcohol licenses in a quota
driven market.
In the cases of taxi medallion holders, the licenses are also legacy
licenses, subject to some level of exclusivity and transferability under
a quota system. In addition, those licenses had substantial property
value due to an advanced secondary market. Only recently has the
government in certain jurisdictions moved to open up those legacy
taxi markets, and the holders of the taxi medallions sued under a vari-
ety of claims, including Fifth Amendment takings claims.
Owners of taxi medallions in a closed market have filed takings
claims when the governmental entity passed an ordinance to open the
market to additional licensees." 8 As of yet, none of the legacy license
holders have been successful in their takings claims.
117. Id. at 1335.
118. See, e.g., Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coal., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 572 F.3d 502, 504
(8th Cir. 2009).
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The taxi medallion cases advance the Peanut Quota Holder case and
additionally review whether a takings claim is valid for a legacy license
system where the license is capped or regulated, creating substantial
value on the secondary market, and government action opens the
market for new participants.
The taxi medallion system has been in place parallel to the alcohol
quota system. Similar to alcohol license markets, consumers are push-
ing for changes in the antiquated legacy transportation market system.
For example, Uber"19 has created an expectation of mobility around
major metropolitan areas that has affected medallion license holders
as consumers' expectation of service has increased. 120
During the late 1920s and 1930s, many jurisdictions began to re-
quire licenses for taxi systems. New York's taxi regulatory system is
particularly illustrative of the regulatory scheme that exists in many
metropolitan areas.
The end of the Nineteenth Century saw a major increase in the
number of automobiles, which also increased the number of automo-
biles "hiring themselves out in competition with horse drawn car-
riages.' 121 New York City, for example, had "nearly one hundred taxi
cabs" and shortly after the turn of the Century, there were many
"large fleets and thousands of independent driver/owners."'1 22 In
1937, after consistent issues with "unfair labor practices, price goug-
ing, and unsafe conditions," then-Mayor of New York City Fiorello H.
La Guardia "signed the Haas Act, which introduced New York's first
... taxi licenses and medallion system."'1 23 The medallion system re-
mains in place today in many major cities.'2 4
"Medallions are small plates attached to the hood of the taxis certi-
fying that the car is available for passenger pick-up." 25 Many juris-
119. Uber, Lyft and other companies are ride-sharing services developing primarily in urban
areas where private drivers offer ride services previously controlled by taxi companies. Such
companies are opening markets that are arguably regulated to prevent such competition.
AirBnB, a room sharing service provides a similar market-opening concept in the hotel industry.
See Sangeet Choudary, How The Hotel Industry Got Blindsided . .. And Why Yours Could Be
Next, FORBES (July 7, 2014, 11:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2014/07/O7/how-
the-hotel-industry-got-blindsided-and-why-yours-could-be-next/.
120. See Yellow Group LLC, et. al. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 1:2012cv07967, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 94093, at *20-21 (N.D. Il. 2014).
121. Dennis Melancon, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, LEAGLE.COM, http://www.leagle.com/deci-
sion/In%20FDCO%2020120821B51/DENNIS %20MELANCON,%20INC.%20v. %20
CITY%200F%20NEW%200RLEANS (last visited May 15, 2015) (providing an in-depth anal-
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dictions capped the number of licenses, and the limited number of
medallions allowed the cities to manage enforcement actions and
quality of taxi activity. 126 The medallion system became entrenched in
many major markets, and a secondary market for the medallions has
created significant value.
Recently, there has been an economic and consumer push to change
the regulatory system to allow for an increased market, in New Orle-
ans, Chicago, and Minneapolis.
In 2006, the City of Minneapolis "amended its taxicab ordinance to
uncap the number of transferrable taxicab licenses issu[ed by the
City]" that led to litigation against the City by current license hold-
ers.127 Similar to a liquor license, the taxicab licenses (medallions)
were "originally purchased from the City for a relatively small fee [of
$500]," and were transferrable. 128 A secondary market developed for
the medallions, which generated sales of $19,000 to $25,000.129 Begin-
ning in 2006, the City held "open public convenience and necessity
hearings," pursuant to Minneapolis Code of Ordinances. 30 After the
hearing, the City's Department of Licenses and Consumer Services
submitted information indicating an "insufficient availability of taxis,
especially handicap accessible taxis and, during peak hours, taxicabs
generally," with potential plans to ameliorate the matter. 131 The
Committee determined it would implement a plan to "increase[ ] the
number of licenses by forty-five each year until 2010 when the cap
would be completely lifted.' 32 The plan also required a certain per-
centage of licensed taxi fleet to be "wheelchair-accessible vehicles and
fuel efficient vehicles."'133
In 2007, a coalition of licensees under the older system sued the
City of Minneapolis in Minnesota state court claiming, "the new ordi-
nance reduced the value of the existing licenses to zero."' 134 Four
claims were made:
(1) the City deprived coalition members of their property interests
without just compensation; (2) the City deprived Coalition members
of their business licenses without due process; (3) the wheelchair-
accessibility and fuel-efficiency requirements constituted an uncon-
126. Dennis Melancon, supra note 121.




130. Id. at 505.
131. Id.
132. Minneapolis Tax Owns Coal., Inc., 572 F.3d at 505.
133. Id. at 506.
134. Id.
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stitutional extraction; and (4) the coalition members were denied
equal protection because the amended, in part, to better serve the
Hispanic community. 135
The case was removed to the federal district court, and the court de-
cided the issue on a summary judgment motion.136
Of most interest and parallel to the liquor licensing system is the
takings claim. Citing Article Five of the U.S. Constitution, "[t]he Co-
alition argues that removing the cap on taxicab licenses is a taking of
private property requiring just compensation" due to the devaluing of
the license when the cap was removed.137 The City did not contest
that the license was devalued.138 The Eighth Circuit analyzed the tak-
ings claim, noting that "[t]he elimination of the market value of the
license[ ] ... can only be considered a taking... if there is a protected
property interest in the market value. 1 39 The Eighth Circuit further
noted that none of the cases cited by the Coalition were applicable
because the cases addressed full revocation of the licenses at issue. 140
Interestingly, one of the cases directly discussed by the Eighth Circuit
was State v. Saugen.141 In Saugen, the Minnesota Supreme Court ad-
dressed a takings argument when a liquor licensee was unable to move
his license to a new location, which effectively destroyed a "valid and
unrevoked ability to engage in the liquor business."'1 42
The Federal District Court disagreed that the Coalition has a valid
property interest that had been taken with the opening of the market.
The court noted "a property interest cannot be extended to the going-
concern value of a licensed business where that going-concern value is
merely speculative. 1 43 The court also discounted the Coalition's
claim that "a license to participate in a controlled market is a property
interest in the restricted nature of that market, such that the City can-
not, without just compensation, reduce the market value . .. by in-
creasing [the number of licenses]."'1 44 The court notes that taxicab
licenses are not similar to Peanut Quota Holders licenses, which have
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Minneapolis Tax Owns Coal., Inc., 572 F.3d at 506-07.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992)).
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. State v. Saugen, 169 N.W.2d 37, 47 (Minn. 1969).
143. Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coal., Inc., 572 F.3d at 508 (citing Saugen, 169 N.W.2d at 46;
City of Minneapolis v. Schutt, 256 N.W.2d 260, 262-63 (Minn. 1977) (limiting Saugen to its
facts)).
144. Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coal., Inc., 572 F.3d at 508.
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a guaranteed minimum price structure. Such a minimum creates a
"concreteness of value" not found in the taxicab license.145
The Eighth Circuit goes on to note that "in the case of personal
property, by reason of the State's traditionally high degree of control
over commercial dealings, a [property owner] ought to be aware of
the possibility that new regulation might even render his property eco-
nomically worthless .... ",146 The court also cited Mitchell Arms, Inc. v.
United States, which stated that an enforceable property interest "can-
not arise in an area voluntarily entered into and one which, from the
state, is subject to pervasive Governmental control."'1 47
Finally, the court addressed that the Coalition claimed that its tak-
ings claim is "limited to the ability of realize an expectation in the
ultimate market disposition of the license."148 The court stated that
the collateral interest is not protected by the Fifth Amendment. 149 In
essence, even if there were a property interest in the license, the Coa-
lition cannot assert that the government is responsible for a "property
interest that is different and more expansive than the one actually pos-
sessed" - i.e, the value on the secondary market. 150
In the end, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld-
the district court.' 51 The court distinguished the scenario where a ju-
risdiction, "created for its citizens a public marketplace for the assign-
ment of its taxicab licenses ... [where] the taxicab licenses in reality
became more than just mere personal permits" from the taxi medal-
lion case at issue where "licensees are still able to use their licenses
and assign their licenses to others [and, as such, t]he economic effect is
harder to distinguish.' 52 The court declined to establish a compensa-
ble interest. 53
Thus, the Eighth Circuit is careful to distinguish from the factual
case where a licensee is entirely unable to use an aspect of their li-
cense that the licensee previously had, such as license restrictions in
Saugen and Boonstra, and a scenario where the licensee can still use
the license, but its potential economic value on the secondary market
is constricted or eliminated.
145. Id. This is an interesting reference because, ultimately, Peanut Quota Holders denied the
Fifth Amendment claim.
146. Id. at 509 (citing to Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28).
147. Id. quoting Mitchell Arms, Inc. v. U.S., 7 F.3d 212, 216 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
148. Id. (citing Mitchell Arms, Inc., 7 F.3d at 217) (inner quotations omitted).
149. Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coal., Inc., 572 F.3d at 509.
150. Id. at 509.
151. Id. at 510.
152. Id. at 507 n.4 (citing Boonstra v. City of Chi., 574 N.E.2d 689, 694 (Il. App. Ct. 1991)).
153. Id.
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1. When Does a Takings Claim Prevail?
Similar to Boonstra v. City of Chicago, New Orleans attempted to
partially restrict the taxicab licenses by method of municipal ordi-
nance change, and the Court upheld a protected property interest
when the state attempted to prohibit transfers of licenses. 154 In Me-
lancon v. City of New Orleans, the Eastern District of Louisiana con-
solidated three individual cases and disposed of them under a Motion
for Declaratory Relief when the City of New Orleans attempted to
place certain new restrictions on taxicab licenses. 155 Specifically, the
Ordinances attempted to prevent use of salvaged vehicles, prohibit
transfers of a license when a suspension or revocation was pending,
and require certain tracking, receipts, credit card usage, security sys-
tems and GPS systems. 156 The plaintiffs contested the validity and
legality of the ordinances under the contracts clause, the Fifth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. 157
The court determined that the licensees had a protectable property
interest in their licenses, specifically because of the "ability to sell,
encumber, lease and alienate their [licenses].' 1 58 The court stated that
the ordinance directive to change the license from a right to a privi-
lege was insufficient "if a government's grant to a citizen has demon-
strated characteristics inherent to a property right, such as the ability
to transfer, encumber, lease or sell, for nearly sixty years, it may not
convert it to a privilege by simply characterizing it as such."'159 This is
in line with the holding in Boonstra v. City of Chicago,160 holding that
the City of Chicago could not disallow the assignment of licenses
when there was an established legacy secondary market.
The court went on to analyze whether the ordinance triggered an
unconstitutional taking of that protectable property right by looking
at regulatory takings jurisprudence. 161 Specifically, the court refer-
enced the Penn Central test.162 As discussed earlier, the Penn Central
Court created a multi-factor test to determine whether a regulatory
taking occurred. 163 "According to the Penn Central frameworks,
courts should consider three factors (1) the character of the govern-
154. Dennis Melancon, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 889 F. Supp. 2d 808 (E.D. La. 2012).
155. Id. at 812.
156. Id. at 812-13.
157. Id. at 813.
158. Id. at 817.
159. Id. at 818.
160. Boonstra v. City of Chi., 574 N.E.2d 689, 695 (1I. App. Ct. 1991).
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mental action (2) the economic impact on the claimant and (3) the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with the property
owner's reasonable investment backed expectation. 1 164 The court de-
termined that the plaintiffs, in this instance, brought sufficient evi-
dence to demonstrate that the City "reduced the value of the licenses
to zero," leading the court to determine that the City's regulations
interfered significantly with the reasonable investment-backed expec-
tation.165 In sum, the court concluded "the evidence on the record
support[ed] the conclusion that the Plaintiffs have a substantial likeli-
hood of success on their unconstitutional taking claim."'166
In Dennis Melancon, the court's initial analysis for determining
whether a preliminary injunction was proper foumd that the plaintiffs
were likely to prevail on the takings claim, and that the defendants
failed to prove any evidence of public harm. The key distinction in
the treatment of the license is critical. In both Melancon and Boon-
stra, the ordinances attempted to restrict the plaintiffs from using their
license, with a system that had been in place for over sixty years. In
the Minneapolis case, the court found that the licensees were still en-
tirely able to use their license, and that the taking did not extend to
the secondary market. This analysis seems based on an economic
analysis of a secondary market in Melancon and Boonstra, but the
courts in Peanut Quota Holders and Minneapolis Taxi found the sec-
ondary market valuation not persuadable.
2. What Can We Take from the Legacy Taxi Medallion Cases?
In comparing Minneapolis Taxi and Meloncon, we can conclude
that restrictions on existing licenses, especially with a valuable secon-
dary market, may trigger a cognizable takings claim, but the claim is
unlikely to be successful. Courts are challenged by the economic im-
pact of deregulation when the licensees are a fixed class, creating a
significant secondary market value. Even under a Penn Central ad
hoc factual test, the courts, however, have recognized that the govern-
ment's authority to open the market (as long as the prior statutory
system has no restrictions) is absolute.
Thus, the ability for a licensee to bring a successful takings claim
appears to be a red herring. A legacy license system, in which a licen-
see has extensive value in the license (with the ability to transfer the
license, use it for mortgage options, have a realistic expectation that
the government cannot restrict the use of that license without com-
164. Id.; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
165. Dennis Melancon, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d at 819-20.
166. Id. at 821.
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pensation) is subject to the consumer push to open that market and
devalue that licensee's legacy value and there will be little considera-
tion of the secondary market value, as seen in the Peanut Quota Hold-
ers and Taxi Medallion analysis.
Under Melancon, however, one can note that the court is not en-
tirely unsympathetic to a legacy system that has created a quasi-gov-
ernmental stability over a long period of time. But, under factual
analysis relating to the character of the governmental action, the graz-
ing cases, Mitchell Arms and Peanut Quota Holders, as well as Minne-
apolis Taxi, tell us the courts find that the governmental entity has full
right and ability to change a licensing system at any time.
Thus, if the question is a weighing of the three prongs of Penn Cen-
tral, a plaintiff licensee will have an arguably good claim for the first
prong, a questionable claim for the second prong, and little support, if
any, for the third prong. Even if courts will likely recognize the eco-
nomic effect on the plaintiff licensees, such a factual analysis will
likely create a cognizable, but ultimately unsuccessful, legal claim.
More likely, the economic impact on the licensees directs them to use
political pressure to prevent a governmental entity from opening up
or deregulating a closed licensing system.
If courts use Peanut Holder or Minneapolis Taxi analysis, the sup-
port is overwhelming for allowing license change, and there is no cog-
nizable legal claim. Courts however, seem leery to quickly discount
the plaintiffs' economic argument. Is it possible that the courts' deci-
sions are affected by unstated political pressures, economic realities of
devaluing current licensee's value on the secondary market, or public
health factors? So far, the threat of the takings claim (or at least the
belief that a legacy license has value) has kept these claims out of the
courts and little legislative change has occurred.
D. Game Farms and Comparative Law
While taxi medallion cases may be illustrative in comparing histori-
cal licenses, the Montana 167 Supreme Court addressed the devaluation
167. Montana has restrictive alcohol license quotas that were set by census numbers in the
1940s. See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 16-4-201. The public has begun to question the quota system,
especially with the increase of craft breweries, and, while no takings claims have been raised, the
legislators are beginning to consider whether the system should be changed. This can be seen in
the expansion of the brewery licensing systems and the increasing number of newspaper articles
and discussions regarding the effects of the quota system on economic development. See Alex-
ander Deedy, Liquor License Capped Out: Montana at Limit Under Quota System, HELENA
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of licenses in a highly regulated industry, and whether a takings claim
can prevail when the licensing system is subject to extensive regula-
tory oversight. 168 Most interesting to this case is the extensive dissent
arguing that courts should address the extensive economic impact to
licenses when a regulatory system changes to the detriment to current
participants. Such considerations raised by the dissent may not trump
the government's ability to regulate its license framework, but may
hold sway with government regulators when looking at the process to
open a previously closed market.
The game farm licenses, both its regulatory framework and the val-
uation of the licenses, are substantially similar to alcohol legacy li-
censes, though not as entrenched in the legal system. While the
Montana Supreme Court majority denies the takings claim,169 the dis-
sent speaks extensively to the economic impact of eliminating the eco-
nomic value gained in a licensing system, and argues for more
consideration of the licensees' investment. 170 The argument is worth
consideration in analyzing regulatory takings cases with high eco-
nomic impact -to licensees.
The Montana Supreme Court addressed takings in the context of a
regulatory change to a valuable license when determining that a li-
cense to operate a game farm, intangible business assets, and the go-
ing concern value of game farms was not a compensable property
interest under the federal takings clause. 171 Game farms are typically
ranches, where game farm licensees manage herds of elk or other tro-
phy animals popular with hunters. 172 In this case, the owners and op-
erators of several alternative livestock game farms filed action against
the state, alleging a taking of compensable property as a result of an
initiative that prohibited charging a fee to shoot alternative livestock.
To operate a game farm requires a license issued by Montana Fish
Wildlife and Parks. Due to the threat of Chronic Wasting Disease (a
disease that can be transmitted from alternative livestock such as elk
to domestic livestock such as cattle), the license requirements were
demanding. 173 Several plaintiffs owned and operated game farms,
some of which allowed for big game hunts. A Citizens Initiative was
passed in 2000, which severely limited the game farm licenses by disal-
lowing transfer of the license and also disallowing any shooting of
168. See Kafka v. Montana Dep't. of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 201 P.3d 8 (Mont. 2008).
169. Id. at 23.
170. Id. at 43 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
171. See id. at 25.
172. Id. at 13.
173. Kafka, 201 P.3d at 36.
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game for a fee at the alternative livestock facility. 174 The parties con-
ceded that the game farm industry was highly regulated. The District
Court reviewed the economic impact of the Initiative on the plaintiffs
and considered whether there was a taking under the Penn Central
test.175 Ultimately, the District Court decided that any reasonable in-
vestment backed expectation appellants may have had regarding their
game farms had to be tempered against "the reality that they were
operating in a highly regulated, controversial field, where the Sate was
free to change the regulatory environment. 1 76 The plaintiffs ap-
pealed the decision to the Montana Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court noted that the takings claim required a two-
step analysis, which first required a determination regarding whether
a cognizable property interest as a factual question, and then if a cog-
nizable property interest exists, whether the governmental action at
use constituted a taking of the property. 77 The Court noted that gen-
erally "a license is simply a right or privilege granted by a sovereign
authority to engage in a certain activity," but that such license may
contain property interests, such as a professional license or medical
license. 178 The Court reviewed the Peanut Quota Holders case, noting
that even though the Peanut Quota Holders may have a compensable
property interest, "the government was under no constitutional duty
to compensate the Members because neither the state nor the sur-
rounding circumstances indicated that the quotas were irrevocable,
and the government always maintained "its right to withdraw those
benefits or qualify them as it chooses.' 79
The Court ultimately noted that the licenses in question did not
meet the required criteria under Peanut Quota Holders, and thus no
takings had occurred. 180 The Court further concluded that there was
no taking of goodwill or other intangible property.' 81
While the game farm case does not address the opening of a regula-
tory system and the majority did not analyze property aspects in as
much depth as the taxi medallion cases, the Montana Supreme Court
did note that "the District Court found no case law for the proposition
that a taking of a license occurs when a new regulatory requirement,
174. Id. at 13.
175. See id. at 16-17.
176. Id. at 16.
177. Id. at 18.
178. Kafka, 201 P.3d at 19-20.
179. Id. at 21 (citing Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Assn. Inc. v. United States, 421
F.3d 1323, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
180. Id. at 23.
181. Id. at 104.
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or in this case a regulatory prohibition, 'ma[kes] the licensed business
less profitable than it had been prior to the new regulations.' 1 82 Fur-
ther, the District Court observed that "[w]hen state law creates the
privilege of holding a license to engage in a heavily regulated business
like game farming is in Montana, it need not pay compensation when
it changes the conditions under which that privilege may be
exercised."1 83
The Court continues with an interesting discussion of intangible
value, and notes that "[an expectation of profitability in a highly reg-
ulated field of business, where a license or permit is required for par-
ticipation, is virtually never, in and of itself, considered a compensable
property interest.' 84
In an extensive analysis, the dissent raised parallel considerations
not addressed in Peanut Quota Holders or Minneapolis Taxi. In a
lengthy dissent, Justice Nelson argues that the Supreme Court uses a
due process analysis, and notes that, in light of the discussion in Lingle
v. Chevron1 85 analysis would be more proper, looking to "whether the
regulation is so onerous that its-effect is tantamount to a direct appro-
priate or ouster. ' 186 The dissent argues that Lingle requires a "focus
... on the severity of the burden ... on private property rights."'1 87
The dissent claims that this is not a partial takings claim, since
"none of the businesses in the industry can survive after 1-143."188 In-
terestingly, the dissent references State v. Saugen, a case that was ex-
plicitly distinguished in the taxi medallion case. 189
The game farm case illustrates the disadvantage of an ad hoc factual
test, as the Court comes to a split decision. Both the majority and the
dissent review Supreme Court precedent and ultimately come to dis-
tinctly differing decisions, and is one of the few cases that directly ad-
dressed the economic effect on a current license holder. The game
farm case again looks to the effect of the government severely restrict-
ing a market however, and not the effect of a government allowing for
increased access to the licensing system.
182. Id. at 19. The restriction of transferability is closer to the facts of Boonstra and Melancon.
Regardless, the Court here ultimately denies the takings claim.
183. Kafka, 201 P.3d at 19.
184. Id. at 24.
185. In Lingle, the Supreme Court reviewed whether a compensable taking occurred with
Hawaii's implementation of a rent-cap on oil companies. Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
186. Kafka, 201 P.3d at 19 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005)).
187. Id. at 47.
188. Id. at 60.
189. See id. at 62.
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The Montana Supreme Court notes that the purpose of the takings
scholarship is to bar the "Government from forcing people alone to
bear public burdens, which in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole."1 90 In the cases where a prior regulation has
created a legacy system with a secondary market, such as taxi medal-
lions, peanut quotas, and alcohol licenses, it is the governmental enti-
ties and the public who are bearing the burden of the restrictive
system. The legacy license holders are benefitting from an advanced
secondary market-based value derived solely from a legacy govern-
mental program. There is little public justification to allow for any
compensation for their secondary market investment.
E. Relationship of Property to Value
The dissent in the game farm cases highlights the unstated tension
in the Penn Central analysis. The holdings in cases addressing the
opening of markets rest on the analysis of the third consideration of
Penn Central, and barely address the first two considerations. How-
ever, no court directly states that the third prong trumps the other two
prongs, or that the factual test, in reality, gives no weight to the first
two prongs, and, yet, courts have yet to state that the third prong,
governmental ability to change the regulatory structure, should trump
the other two factors. When the government restricts transferability,
the courts address the Penn Central's first two factors; those of the
economic effects on the petitioner. Such a tension may create contin-
ued inconsistencies as courts address regulatory cases.
In considering whether a taking can be claimed in future cases, an
examination of the property rights in comparison to the question of
value or valuation may be illustrative. 191 The property value may be
the assumptive dollar amount that an owner requires to transfer the
property (fair market value; a willing owner and willing buyer). In the
instance of a license in a legacy system such as an alcohol quota li-
cense, consideration should also be given to the long standing legal
proposition that a business owner has no right to the continued pa-
tronage of customers. 192 Further, while freedom from more than typi-
cal disruption of a business may be valuable, it does not rise to the
190. Id at 30.
191. This Article does not address the methods or concepts behind remedies in a regulatory
takings scenario, which, of course, would involve determining a fair market value for the prop-
erty that is the subject of the taking.
192. See STEVEN J, EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 1-7(e) (5th ed. 2012) (citing Y.B. 11
H.IV 47 (1410) (anonymous note of case in which school master held to have no cause of action
against new school teacher who lures away his students to a new school) (described in Keeble v.
Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B. 1707)).
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level of property. 193 The Supreme Court in Reichelderfer v. Quinn
notes "the existence of value alone does not generate interests pro-
tected by the Constitution against diminution by the government,
however unreasonable its actions may be."'1 94
John Echeverria, in Chapter 9 of Taking Sides on Takings Issues,
analyzes an alternative economic concept behind the partial takings
claim. He notes two distinct considerations for considering valuation
of a partial taking, first noting that one can look at the "proportion of
the market value or use rights retained under the challenged regula-
tory regime."'1 95 Alternatively, he notes that one can look at the initial
or original investment of a claimant and compare that value to the
market value of the property subject to the regulatory restrictions.196
Under either analysis, a licensee in a legacy system is likely to have no
claim of economic impact' 97 that would rise to the level of a Fifth
Amendment takings claim. Echeverria provides a practical considera-
tion for this holding and notes that
[i]n a typical taking case, the unregulated value of the property is
estimated based on the market value the property would have if the
challenged regulation were lifted for the owner's property. -This ap-
proach plainly overestimates the market value of the property be-
cause it gives the owner the benefit of not having to comply with the
regulation while simultaneously crediting him with the economic
benefit of some or all of his neighbor's compliance with the same
regulation."198
He notes that litigators and judges then typically compare "between
the property's market value if unregulated and its market value if
regulated."'199
193. See id. at § 1-7(e) (citing Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B. 1707)) ("wa-
terfowl netter must tolerate fair competition from neighboring property"). See also Willis v.
Univ. of N. Ala., 826 So. 2d 118,121 (Ala. 2002) (construction of parking deck may decrease use
of owner's property but does not rise to level of taking).
194. 287 U.S. 315, 319 (1932).
195. John D. Echeverria, Do Partial Regulatory Takings Exist?, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS
ISSUES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 226 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002).
196. See id.
197. For example, the taxi medallion owners argue diminution of value based not on loss of a
$500 license, but upon loss of exclusivity of the market. Licensees under an alcohol quota sys-
tem may argue that the loss is not the use of the $500 or $1000 license, which those claimants still
have and can use, but rather the loss of their relative position in the market. While this Article
does not address the remedies and valuation methodologies if a takings claim were successful in
a legacy license claim, there is little doubt that the exceedingly high valuation and high amount
of funds at issue drive the underlying factual and legal analysis that Courts are considering in
these types of cases.
198. Echeverria, supra note 195, at 245.
199. Id.
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V. WHAT Is DIFFERENT ABOUT ALCOHOL REGULATION AND ON-
PREMISE LIQUOR LICENSES?
As noted in the beginning of this Article, alcohol has been a critical
commodity for the U.S. (like many intoxicants such as coffee, tea, to-
bacco and certain pharmaceuticals). Alcohol, however, is the only
commodity in the U.S. subject to its own constitutional references,
and, in fact, is the subject of the only Constitutional Amendment ever
repealed, and finally (as noted by Constitutional scholar Lawrence
Tribe) an individual's sole chance to violate the Constitution without
resorting to owning a slave.200
The long history of alcohol as a commodity, and also its specific
Constitutional framework provides that alcohol licensing has many le-
gal, economic and public policy considerations to its licensing frame-
work. As an intoxicant, the regulation of alcohol generally is subject
to strict regulation and high taxes and fees. The specific Constitu-
tional frameworks mean that sales of alcohol to a consumer are highly
regulated from production/wholesale to the retailer to the consumer,
and may be regulated on a federal, state or local level, creating a frag-
mented and byzantine system of regulation in the various states.
On-premise alcohol licensing is quite similar in its legal and eco-
nomic framework to the concerns about regulating public safety for
taxis and peanut quotas, with an added level of Constitutional consid-
eration. When liquor control in involved, the Twenty-First Amend-
ment confers "something more than the normal state authority over
public health, welfare, and morals. '20 1 What drives this complex rela-
tionship that consumers and regulators have with the regulation of
alcohol?
Along with the unique constitutional considerations, alcohol is an
intoxicant, "acting on the central nervous system" and creating a dis-
tortion of "perception and emotional response. '20 2 Alcohol as an in-
toxicant is one of a spectrum of intoxicants from tea and coffee,
tobacco, alcohol, marijuana and on to opiates. Alcohol, like many in-
toxicants, has a long history and has been part of human existence
200. See Lawrence H. Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without Really Trying: Lessons
from the Repeal of the Prohibition to the Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 CONST. COMMENT.
217, 220 (1995), for a discussion of the failings of the Twenty-First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.
201. City of Rancho Cucamonga v. Warner Consulting Servs., 262 Cal. Rptr. 349, 351 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (quoting California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972)).
202. JAN-WILLEM GERRITSEN, THE CONTROL OF FUDDLE AND FLASH: A SOCIOLOGICAL His-
TORY OF REGULATION OF ALCOHOL AND OPIATES 14 (S. Ishwaran ed. 2000).
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since the Stone Age.20 3 It is, as well, subject to a number of public
safety laws and regulations.
For purposes of this Article, the licensees who sell to the public, on-
premise and by the glass, are regulated on the federal and state level,
subject to background checks, and advertising restrictions. Law en-
forcement plays a large role in enforcement actions, especially in rela-
tion to under age drinking and drunk driving enforcement.
Licenses for on-premise alcohol service are set by political directive
on a state or local level, though all on-premise licenses must be regis-
tered with the TTFB. To hold a license, there must be an actual person
responsible for the license itself, on the federal level and state level as
there is a level of individual liability and public safety enforcement
attached to the license.
Consumers have little interest in the archaic and complex licensing
requirements. With changing consumer trends, health studies now in-
dicate that the public can benefit from opening the licensing structure
to allow more businesses to provide alcohol by the glass. Turning to
the expansive studies on_alcohol in relation to community health and
regulatory structure, the majority of studies indicate that states that
have fewer retail packaged spirits stores have significantly higher gov-
ernmental revenues (taxes and costs associated with alcohol). 20 4
Higher density of alcohol retail package locations is associated with
higher rates of suicide, assault, and other violence. 20 5
These studies typically review the middle tier of alcohol control,
looking at consumer access to packaged liquors. The studies do not
indicate any effects of increasing the number of locations that allow
for sales of alcohol by the glass. Additionally, deregulation of the
middle tier in Washington by citizens' initiative demonstrates the new
push in the market to provide more access by the consumer.206 While
the Washington deregulation was focused on the middle tier of the
three-tier-tied house laws, it does demonstrate that expectation of al-
cohol accessibility is shifting, and legacy licensees should predict shift-
ing of their license interests. Research within the last year has not
203. Id. at 24.
204. Matin Institute Report, Control State Politics: Big Alcohol's Attempt to Dismantle Regu-
lation State by State, MARIN INSTITUTE 6 (Sept. 2010).
205. Id.
206. Citizens Initiatives to open up the regulatory structure in the liquor distribution process
caused a massive shift in the Washington liquor market. Not only were Washington state jobs
shifted out of the public sector, the prices of the liquor was extremely volatile for the first year of
deregulation. The effects of Citizens Initiative 1183 are summarized in Pamela S. Erickson's
report. See Erickson, supra note 28, at 6.
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indicated that Washington is suffering from any increased public
safety or health issues relating to deregulation of package liquor.20 7
Few studies however, address the retail consumption of alcohol by
the glass. In this aspect, European data provides the most advanced
research for on-premise consumption. Specifically, a significant study
of Alcohol in Europe noted that
[g]enerally, the higher the level of alcohol consumption, the more
serious is the crime or injury. The volume of alcohol consumption,
the frequency of drinking and the frequency and volume of episodic
heavy drinking all independently increase the risk of violence, with
often, but not always, episodic heavy drinking mediating the impact
of volume of consumption on harm.208
In other words, an individual's heavy drinking at a specific location is
the statistically relevant concern. None of the studies reviewed here,
or that the authors found, indicate that an increase in the number of
places where an individual can access a glass of wine, a beer or even a
martini with dinner will increase an individual's heavy drinking.
The European Union addresses alcohol access and risk policy
through restrictive advertising bans, but struggles to address the con-
flicting needs of public health policy and its competing commercial
and economic interests such as the wine industry of Europe.20 9
The European study provides some clarity when reviewing typical
U.S. health studies. The National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Al-
coholism study entitled "Regulating Availability: How Access to Al-
cohol Affects Drinking and Problems in Youths and Adults" finds the
following
four empirical generalizations[:] (1) whenever alcohol sales can be
measured, greater outlet densities are directly related to use; (2)
greater densities of bars and taverns and similar on-premise drink-
ing places are directly related to assaults and violence; (3) greater
densities of bars, taverns, and sometimes restaurants are directly re-
lated to drunken driving and alcohol related crashes; and (4) spatial
effects in these analyses are large, require spatial statistical tech-
niques for unbiased analysis, and suggest the presence of unmea-
sured correlated effects between geographic areas (i.e., the effects
of outlet concentrations in one area have an impact on problems in
another).210
207. DISCUS Economic Contributions, supra note 4.
208. Peter Anderson & Ben Baumberg, Alcohol in Europe a Public Health Perspective, EURO-
PEAN COMMISSION 4 (June 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/phdeterminants
/life-style/alcohol/documents/alcohol_europeen.pdf.
209. Id. at 8.
210. Gruenwald, supra note 53, at 251.
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Again, the studies generally do not focus on the specificities of bars,
restaurants and taverns, and whether there is any differentiation be-
tween increasing the number of restaurants and high-end alcohol by
the glass locations, which provide significant economic benefits to ju-
risdictions by use of moderate sales of alcohols. When coupled with
the notion that higher use of alcohol in a single instance dramatically
increases the societal dangers, the notion of increased restaurants and
locations with moderate sales of alcohol by the glass can increase eco-
nomic benefits to a jurisdiction without unduly increasing societal
dangers.
Further, recent health studies are now focusing on the benefits of
alcohol in moderation. While alcohol is a drug of dependence and
causes a number of diseases, European research also demonstrates
that "a small dose of alcohol ... reduces the risk of coronary heart
disease." 21 ' The U.S. dietary guidelines note that "moderate drinking
can be a part of an adult healthy lifestyle," and the Center for Disease
Control ("CDC") study indicates that moderate drinking can be one
of four "key lifestyle behaviors to help people live longer. '212 In even
more controversial studies, there is some indication that moderate
consumption over time may reduce risk of rheumatoid arthritis, an
inflammatory disease. 213
As moderate consumption continues to popularize, and consumers
have expectations of accessing alcoholic beverages, studies show that
the relative dangers of alcohol may be decreasing, as underage drink-
ing and binge drinking continue to steadily decline.214 Even Washing-
ton State, where an initiative deregulated its three-tier system, is
showing no increase in consumption of alcohol generally. 215
As consumers demand change to the archaic on-premise licensing
systems, alcohol studies indicate growing benefits of moderate con-
sumption, and studies further show that it is the concentrated con-
sumption of alcohol that is problematic, public policy would benefit by
opening up licensing to allow businesses to use a business model that
can survive on moderate consumption and sale of alcohol. Under the
current system, a new business has a high barrier and cost to enter the
market and market forces will then require exceedingly high alcohol
sales to cover the excessive cost of accessing a license, much less for a
211. Anderson & Baumberg, supra note 208, at 4.
212. DISCUS Economic Contributions, supra note 4, at 10.
213. See Henrik Kallberg et al., Alcohol Consumption is Associated with Decreased Risk of
Rheumatoid Arthritis: Results from Two Scandinavian Case-Control Studies, NCBI (Feb. 2009),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18535114.
214. DISCUS Economic Contributions, supra note 4, at 8.
215. See Erickson, supra note 28, at 18.
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business to become profitable. Such a barrier to the market is not
justified by public safety arguments, health arguments, or legal protec-
tive arguments, such as takings claims, made by current licensees.
While the differences in alcohol, its regulation and legal history are
extensive, there is no indication that such differences would require or
even indicate use of a different structure for a legal review of a regula-
tory change to a licensing system. Further, recent health studies do
not indicate any additional concerns with opening up the on-premise
alcohol licenses to new market participants.
VI. SUGGESTED POLICY CHANGES
Review of the current jurisprudence has demonstrated that opening
the legacy markets to new participants will provide increased eco-
nomic development, without adverse effects on public safety concerns.
If a regulatory jurisdiction resists fully opening the markets, there are
certain interim steps that a governmental entity might consider to ap-
pease the American consumer. Policy makers can use gradual regula-
tory change by increasing the number of licenses, without removing
the quota system altogether. Such gradual opening of the legacy li-
cense system allows the market to self-correct, thus providing some
license value stability for legacy license holders, while still providing
increased access by entrepreneurs to the market. That increased ac-
cess to the market will provide beneficial economic growth, satisfy
consumers and will not negatively affect public health.
Many states have moved towards reform of liquor laws.216 In Ken-
tucky 2013, the Governor's Task Force on the Study of Kentucky's
Alcoholic Beverage Control Laws released its report.217 Within the
report, the Task Force recommended consolidation of certain non-
quota licenses that had begun to be created in the 1980s and allowed
certain locations to serve alcohol to consumers outside the quota sys-
tem, specifically for franchise development.218 Those licenses now in-
clude hotels, restaurants, airports, and other non-quota on-premise
style licenses. 219 The Task Force recommended combining all of the
separate statutes into a single non-quota on-premise alcohol sales li-
cense. 220 This type of license could be created or expanded in other
216. Michigan Governor's Task Force released its report in 2011 with the following commen-
tary more clearly explaining the political controversy in the industry. Michale D. Lafaive, Com-
mentary: Recommendations for Gov. Snyder's Liquor Control Advisory Rules Committee, MICH.
CAPITOL CONFIDENTIAL (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/15922.
217. Governor's Task Force, supra note 10.
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jurisdictions to allow new enterprises access to a license that function-
ally allows the same on-premise alcohol sales without disintegrating
the current license system. For states such as Montana, where gam-
bling is intrinsically tied to the alcohol quota system,221 creating a new
license type which is not tied to gambling licenses, and incorporates all
of the current non-quota licenses such as service groups, restaurant
beer and wine licenses and other similar licenses 222 would prevent
claims relating to the devaluation of the quota license, or at least
lessen the economic and legal effects on that legacy license.
Gradual increase of the number of licenses in a legacy system is,
however, not necessary to have courts uphold a license system, but is
merely a consideration for governmental regulators if the regulators
wish to have slowed negative economic impact to current licensees, as
well as slower change to the current system, and slower economic
growth.
VII. CONCLUSION
The following is illustrative of consideration of opening a legacy li-
censing system to new participants:- The Peanut Quota Holder Court
noted
[t]o be sure, quota holders who transferred their quotas in the ex-
pectation that the benefits of the quota program would continue, in
effect unchanged, lost the value of their quotas when the program
was altered. But, the fact that quota holders expected to continue
to derive benefits from the program does not create rights to com-
pensation from the government. Therefore, as we view this case,
the change in the quota program deprived the quota holder's prop-
erty of value, but the government's conduct did not constitute a
compensable taking of that property. 223
While statutes and ordinances of differing states will affect the po-
tential takings analysis, the considerations of property aspects articu-
lated in the taxi medallion, peanut quotas and game farms provides a
relevant framework top open legacy on-premise alcohol markets to
new market participants, without creating a compensable 224 takings
claim.
221. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 23-5-119 (requiring tonly all-beverage license holders to offer gam-
bling); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 16-4-201 (setting specific quotas for the number of all-beverage
licenses in Montana).
222. See MONT. CODE. ANN tit. 16 for Montana liquor laws, including various license types.
223. Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Assoc. v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 1335 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
224. If the effects of not recognizing a cognizable takings claim seems unduly harsh in liquor
license cases, where a license may be devalued over time as the market is opened to other par-
ticipants, consider the case of Allied-General Nuclear Services v. United States, 839 F.2d 1572
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(Fed. Cir. 1988), where the government actively promoted and induced plaintiff's $200 million
expenditure to build a plutonium recycling plant and then the government refused to issue an
operating permit.

